This paper studies supply chain decisions making between the retailer, supplier, and bank based on warehouse receipt pledge and\nrisk consideration under twice ordering mode.The decentralized supply chain and centralized supply chain are divided by whether\nthe supplier provides repurchase guarantees and whether the retailer offers revenue sharing.We develop a Stackelberg gamemodel\nto analyze the influential mechanism among various actors and use the method of downside risk control to discuss the bankâ??s\nexpected loss and the optimal loan pledge ratio. We carry out a simulation analysis, and the result is shown as follows: (i) either\nfor decentralized or centralized supply chain, the retailerâ??s optimal order quantity and the optimal proportion that the number of\ngoods pledged by the retailerâ??s twice ordering accounts for the number of first-ordering goods are all unique; (ii) the bankâ??s loan\npledge ratio is a monotonically increasing function of disposal value of the unit remaining commodity; (iii) for centralized supply\nchain, the bankâ??s loan pledge ratio is themonotonically increasing function of repurchase ratio and wholesale price provided by the\nsupplier, respectively; (iv) in the decentralized supply chain, the supplierâ??s return mainly comes from the wholesale revenue and is\npositively related to the wholesale volume and wholesale price; in the centralized supply chain, the supplierâ??s return is mainly from\nthe retailerâ??s revenue sharing.
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